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Revisiting Agency and Stewardship Theories: Perspectives from Nonprofit  
Board Chairs and CEOs 
 
ABSTRACT 
Using principal-agent theories, this study examines differences in the perceptions of nonprofit 
CEOs and board chairs on key governance aspects including board performance, leadership, 
satisfaction with diversity, and board meetings. Using data from the CEOs and board chairs of 
474 nonprofit organizations we found statistically significant differences in the governance 
perceptions of these leaders of nonprofit organizations. The findings provide support for an 
agency theory explanation about the differing interests of principals (board chairs) and agents 
(CEO). The findings suggest that these two sets of nonprofit actors frequently operate from 
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Nonprofit organizational governance has traditionally been the role of the board of 
directors (Stone and Ostrower, 2007). Governance includes “the systems and processes 
concerned with ensuring the overall direction, control, and accountability of the organization” 
(Cornforth and Brown, 2014: 4-5). Practitioner literature has converged on good governance 
characteristics that fulfil legal and fiduciary responsibilities and promote effective board 
performance based on board roles and responsibilities including setting the organization’s 
mission and purpose, selecting, supporting and evaluating the chief executive, strategic planning, 
oversight of programs and services, financial, ethical, and legal oversight, fundraising, outreach, 
and recruiting of new board members (e.g. Axelrod, 1994 ; Miller, 2002).  
Prior research suggests that much can be learned about nonprofit organization 
governance and performance by studying the dynamic relationship between the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and board chair (BC) (Siciliano, 2008; Green, Madjidi, Dudley, and Gehlen, 
2001). Yet, little is known about how the CEO and BC view nonprofit governance and board 
performance. Here, we address this knowledge gap by examining CEO and BC perspectives on a 
variety of governance aspects including board performance, leadership, and governance 
practices.  
Although it is important to make a distinction between the CEO and the BC due to the 
need to separate governance and management, CEO and BC behaviors often contribute to 
ambiguity, confusion, and conflict (Otto, 2003). In an effort to increase nonprofit efficacy, the 
present study examines the juxtaposition of CEO and BC perspectives so organizations may 
determine areas which need additional CEO and BC collaboration and areas where they may 
choose to acknowledge and leverage differences. The broader implications of understanding 
CEO and BC perceptions of governance is the practical need to improve board effectiveness, 
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particularly since improving board effectiveness impacts organizational effectiveness (Herman 
and Renz, 2000). 
 Four governance aspects provide a comprehensive view of the roles of BCs and CEOs: 
board performance, leadership (by the CEO and the board), board diversity, and board meeting 
practices. Prior research involving these aspects of governance did not consider the potential for 
differences in perspectives by the CEO and BC. For example, Buse, Bernstein and Bilimoria 
(2014) examined the impact of diversity on board performance by surveying only CEOs, and 
Bradshaw and Fredette’s (2012) research into board level diversity combined results from CEOs, 
board members and BCs. Other empirical studies investigating the relationship between the CEO 
and the board have focused primarily on board members. A comparison of board member and 
CEO ratings of board performance on six general functions (including fiscal oversight, setting 
policy, and ensuring effective leadership) found that the board members’ ratings were 
significantly higher in every instance (Brown, 2007).  Siciliano (2008) found statistically 
significant consensus scores between CEOs and board members only with respect to mission 
statements. CEOs viewed board involvement at a lower level than perceived by board members 
(Green et al., 2001; Siciliano, 2008). LeRoux and Langer (2013) found that board members and 
CEOs were aligned with respect to administrative and management tasks, but differed when 
examining board behaviors and the CEO’s involvement in mission setting and staff oversight 
duties. The present study’s examination of the governance perspectives of both CEOs and BCs 
raises the possibility that identification of respondents may be important for interpretation of 
results in future studies. 
Governance Perspectives  
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The literature delineates nonprofit governance in terms of separation between principals 
(board chair and members) and agents (CEOs) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Governance issues such 
as CEO and board relationships, board performance, leadership and operations are frequently 
studied using two principal-agent theories: agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jenson, 1983) and stewardship theory (Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson, 1997; Sundarmurthy 
and Lewis, 2001). Agency theory is based on a contractual relationship between principal and 
agent with each actor having different goals and interests. The principal delegates control to the 
agent, yet is dependent on the agent to provide services and information on their behalf. 
However, the agent may not always act in ways that are beneficial to the principal creating 
information asymmetries, agent opportunism, and goal conflict (Eisenhardt, 1989). According to 
this theory, the perspectives of CEOs and BCs about effective governance diverge because of the 
conflicting roles, goals and interests of principals and agents (Caers, Du Bois, Jergers, Geiter, 
Schepers, and Pepermans, 2006). Based on the tenets of agency theory, we hypothesize:  
H1a: CEOs and BCs will differ in their perspectives on key governance aspects related to 
board performance, board and organizational leadership, board diversity, and board 
meeting practices. 
Caers et al. (2006) note that the application of agency theory to board-management 
relationships is complex and may be influenced, among other things, by weak or strong board 
control, CEO power, information asymmetry, and the influence of the CEO on board elections 
and nominations. Stewardship theory addresses the principal-agent relationship, but makes the 
assumption that collaboration and trust (rather than control and distrust) exists between the 
principal (board members) and agent (executives) in part because of their high identification with 
the organization. Stewardship theory may be viewed two ways (Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, 
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and Jegers, 2012): (a) the agent will act in the best interest of the principal even if their interests 
diverge because in doing so they will accomplish higher personal outcomes of achievement, 
affiliation and self-actualization (Davis et al., 1997) or (b) the principal’s and agent’s goals are in 
fact perfectly aligned because of commonality of interests (Sundarmurthy and Lewis, 2003). In 
either case, stewardship theory suggests that the governance perspectives of CEOs and BCs will 
largely overlap since they have compatible or aligned goals. Hence a counter-hypothesis based 
on stewardship theory emerges: 
H1b: CEOs and BCs will not differ in their perspectives on key governance aspects 
related to board performance, board and organizational leadership, board diversity, and 
board meeting practices. 
Methods 
Sample 
Data were obtained from the 2012 BoardSource Nonprofit Governance Index of CEOs 
and BCs. This survey is administered biannually by BoardSource, an organization focused on 
exceptional governance practices. After screening the data for complete surveys and matching 
CEO and BC data, the sample consisted of 474 organizations. Responses came from all 50 states 
and included a diverse mix of nonprofit charities, foundations, and associations. These 
organizations have a wide range of operating budgets ranging from under $25,000 to greater than 
$25 million with 27.5% below $1 million, 37% between $1 and $1.49 million, and 36% above 
$1.49 million. The geographic scope of the sample included local (39.7%), regional or within 
state, (24.5%), state (12.2%), regional or multi-state (5.9%), national (10.3%), and international 
(7%). Full time employees varied from one or two (7.8%) to more than one hundred (21.1%), 
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with the latter being the largest category. The CEOs were 94% Caucasian and 63% female. The 
survey did not include questions related to the demographics of the BC. 
Variables 
We used items from the 2012 BoardSource survey relating to board performance, 
leadership, satisfaction with diversity, and board meeting practices. The same questions were 
asked of the CEOs and the BCs. Board performance included 13 items related to the 
organization’s mission, oversight and responsibilities (see Table 1).  Board and CEO leadership 
perspectives were measured using 14 items (see Table 2). To ascertain satisfaction with 
diversity, two questions, each assessed with regard to age, gender, and race/ethnicity, were asked 
of the CEOs and BCs (see Table 3). Board meeting practices were assessed by five items (Table 
4). 
Results 
T-tests were employed to compare the responses of the CEOs and BCsi. Table 1 shows 
the CEO and BC perspectives on board performance.  A statistically significant difference 
between the perceptions of CEOs and BCs emerged for 10 out of 13 board performance items.  
In all cases, BCs’ ratings were higher than CEOs’ ratings, suggesting that BCs perceive that their 
boards were performing at higher levels than CEOs perceive. Three items showed no significant 
difference between CEOs and BCs: legal and ethical oversight, financial oversight, and level of 
commitment and involvement.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Table 2 shows the CEO and BC perspectives on various items related to board and CEO 
leadership. All but one of the 11 items significantly differed in the comparative ratings, with 
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BCs’ ratings being more favorable in each case.  The only factor which demonstrated CEO and 
BC consensus was the extent of collaboration between the CEO and the board. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Table 3 reports comparisons of the satisfaction with diversity items, all but one of which 
were found to be significantly different between CEOs and BCs.  BCs exhibited significantly 
higher satisfaction with the age, gender, and racial/ethnic diversity of the board. However, 
CEOs’ perceptions of the extent to which age and race/ethnic diversity would increase the 
organization’s ability to achieve its mission were significantly higher than those of BCs. This 
was the only instance in which CEOs had a significantly higher perception than BCs in the entire 
study. CEOs and BCs showed consensus in their perspectives of the extent to which gender 
diversity would increase their organization’s ability to achieve its mission.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
When comparing the perceptions of CEOs and BCs about board meeting practices, only 
two of the five factors were statistically different (see Table 4). The items exhibiting consensus 
were: “board members are prepared for meetings”, “board members receive information needed 
to make decisions”, and “board members focus on strategy and policy rather than on operational 
issues”. BCs’ ratings were higher than CEOs’ ratings for the remaining two items: “meetings are 
well run” and “meetings allow adequate time for board members to ask questions”.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------ 
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Overall, the study’s findings suggest strong support for an agency theory view of 
principals and agents in that BCs and CEOs differed on the majority of items related to board 
performance (10 of 13 items), board and CEO leadership (13 of 14 items), and satisfaction with 
and importance of diversity (3 of 5 items) for all organizations.  The stewardship view of 
principals and agents received modest support with regard to effective processes of board 
meetings in that 3 out of 5 items showed no differences in the perspectives of CEOs and BCs.  
Discussion 
The findings indicate more support for H1a, agency theory, than H1b, stewardship 
theory, with 30 of the 38 items demonstrating statistically significant higher ratings from BCs 
than CEOs. The interpretations of the BCs were higher for virtually all measures in all 
categories, except for the functionality of board meetings. These findings may indicate either that 
CEOs lack confidence in their boards’ ability to fulfill the basic duties required of board 
members or that BCs are overconfident about their boards’ abilities to govern. One of the few 
items that showed convergence between the CEOs and BCs was that “board members receive 
information necessary to make informed decisions”, yet, we are concerned that the BCs may be 
unaware of information that was not provided to them by the CEOs and that these unexpectedly 
strong divergent perspectives may be due to information asymmetry. While perfect information 
symmetry will likely never be achieved, it is important that the CEOs share knowledge and 
information with both parties striving toward an open governance environment (Stone and 
Ostrower, 2007). With regard to board performance, only the areas of legal and ethical oversight, 
financial oversight and the level of board commitment and involvement showed no statistical 
differences between the responses of CEOs and BCs, possibly because these governance 
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components may have relatively clear guidelines, reporting mechanisms and policies in place or 
may be regulated for nonprofit organizations receiving government funding.  
Compared with CEOs, BCs were more satisfied with the age, gender, and racial/ethnic 
diversity of their boards. Conversely, CEOs reported significantly higher beliefs than BCs that 
increasing age and racial/ethnic diversity would increase their organization’s ability to achieve 
its mission. The CEOs’ perspectives are consistent with Buse et al. (2014) findings, which 
indicate significant direct effects of racial/ethnic diversity and gender on effective governance 
practices and an interaction effect that indicates when boards have greater gender diversity, the 
negative impact of racial diversity on governance practices is mitigated. The convergence of 
CEO and BC perspectives regarding the impact of increased gender diversity on the ability of an 
organization to achieve its mission is consistent with the fact that 63% of the CEOs in the present 
study were women. 
CEO and BC perspectives on board meeting practices resulted in the greatest degree of 
consensus in this study—board members were viewed by both CEOs and BCs as being prepared 
for meetings, receiving information necessary to make informed decisions, and focusing on 
strategy and policy rather than on operational issues.  These findings, in modest support of H1b 
and stewardship theory, may reflect the common practice that both BCs and CEOs are involved 
in meeting preparation and management including information dispersal to board members and 
setting an effective meeting agenda which drives board discussions.  
The divergence of CEO and BC perceptions may be explained by the failure of 
organizations to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of these actors, information 
asymmetry, and board power (perceived or actual) over the CEO (Brown and Guo, 2010). 
Possibly, CEOs and BCs operate in separate environments, one for the CEO that accommodates 
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the complexity of overseeing the operation of the nonprofit organization and another for the BC 
who is removed from the day-to-day operations and interacts primarily with other board 
members. Agency problems frequently occur in nonprofit agencies where a discrepancy between 
the objectives of those setting vision and those executing it exists (Du Bois, Caers, Jegers, De 
Cooman, De Gieter, and Pepermans, 2009). Additionally, when discord between the CEO and 
the board arises, it is often attributed to a disconnection between the vision of the board and the 
organization’s operations under the CEO’s leadership (LeRoux and Langer, 2013). Clarity of 
board members’ own understanding of their roles and responsibilities positively impacts their 
ability to engage in community outreach, fundraise, and recruit new board members (Bernstein, 
Buse, and Slatten, 2015). Disconnects might lead to overzealous managerial power or boards 
overstepping their roles and micromanaging the CEO and organizational operations.  
Nonprofit board members tend to believe that their CEOs would not pursue interests of 
their own and act in ways aligned with the organizational mission in support of stewardship 
theory. According to agency theory, the possibility exists that the agent or CEO has his or her 
own agenda and acts independently of the board. This may be exacerbated when the board 
provides weak CEO control and oversight (Miller, 2002). Conversely, boards that exert too much 
control or power may lead to misperceptions and distrust between the board and the CEO. The 
notion that the board is solely responsible for organizational governance may be too narrow and 
needs to be replaced with the idea that governance is “not a set of responsibilities held by any 
one party but rather as a set of actions that emerges from multiple actors…” (Stone and 
Ostrower, 2007). This may result in a blurring of board and CEO boundaries contrary to the 
delineation of nonprofit governance in terms of agency theory and the separation between the 
principals and the agents.   




Limitations and Implications for Future Research.  
Our findings indicate that when evaluating data from nonprofit organizations, attention 
should be paid to who (CEO or BC) is completing the assessments. This study is limited by using 
only two stakeholder perspectives. Van Puyvelde et al. (2012) suggest, and we concur, that to 
completely comprehend the dynamics of nonprofit governance, one should consider the complex 
multi-layered relationships that exist among stakeholders beyond those of the board and 
manager. Future research should continue to focus on why these differences in perspectives 
exist, in particular understanding why consensus was reached in some areas and not others. We 
recommend examining whether CEOs and BCs have convergent or divergent perspectives on 
issues related to funding and sustainability. We suggest additional inquiry to ascertain the impact 
of the information asymmetry and power issues associated with CEO and BC role differences. 
Further research may determine if the overwhelming support for agency theory may be due to 
the influence of external factors such as individual, organizational, and environmental factors 
which have been shown to influence the CEO and BC (Ostrower and Stone, 2006; Stone and 
Ostrower, 2007).  
Finally, we are concerned about the potential bias of BoardSource survey respondents 
because BoardSource member organizations are probably more likely to be working towards best 
governance practices. For organizations not involved in BoardSource nor responding to the 
survey, the divergences and contrasts may well be starker. In comparison to the broader U.S. 
nonprofit sector three quarters of charitable nonprofits had annual expenses of less than $500,000 
and only four percent had annual expenses over $10 million (National Center for Charitable 
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Statistics, 2015), the BoardSource sample skewed toward larger budget-sized organizations 
potentially exacerbating the influence of agency theory on the findings. 
Implications for Practice.  
This study’s findings of a dominant lack of consensus on important governance issues 
suggests that nonprofit organizations should seek greater CEO and BC/board alignment to 
counter goal divergence, foster a more open environment, improve trust, build better 
communication, understand goals and roles, and ensure the ability of the BC to properly evaluate 
CEO performance. Differing CEO and board objectives need not always translate into agency 
costs and lower organizational performance (Du Bois et al., 2009). Different perspectives 
between an operations-oriented CEO and a strategy-oriented BC could be beneficial and even 
creative if they are willing to engage in open dialogue about similarities and differences and 
come to consensus in the governance process.  
One interpretation of the discrepancy between CEO and BC perspectives is that it may 
indicate a certain hubris and a possible lack of organizational knowledge on the part of BCs. 
Therefore, BCs in accordance with the duty of care may need to ask more probing questions of 
the CEO and admit when they lack knowledge or need additional information. Increased 
dialogue may lead to deeper analyses of board and organizational issues, driving the principal 
agent relationship toward the more aligned goals described by stewardship theory. Conversely, 
CEOs should be more proactive in providing information to BCs regarding virtually all aspects 
of the organization.  
 We recommend that boards delve deeper into the convergent and divergent perspectives 
held on governance, leadership, and performance between board members and CEOs since such 
exploration could inform board members about the everyday realities and constraints 
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experienced by CEOs and contribute to improved board decision-making. For example, 
nonprofit organizations which deliberately seek to improve board performance and engage board 
members in executing recommended board practices such as those presented in the items of this 
study, were more likely to see improved board effectiveness and by extension, organizational 
effectiveness (Herman and Renz, 2000). We encourage nonprofit organizations to employ state-
of-the-field education and training of board members to strengthen board governance and 
ultimately organizational effectiveness.  
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Nonprofit CEO and Board Chair Perspectives on Board Performance  
 
Board Performance Items a 
CEO Rating Board Chair Rating 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Understanding your organization’s mission. 3.44 .737 3.59*** .623 
Strategic planning and thinking strategically. 2.68 .911 2.90*** .859 
Knowledge of your organization’s programs. 2.73 .878 2.99*** .778 
Monitoring organizational performance and 
impact. 
2.54 .957 2.87*** .840 
Legal and ethical oversight. 3.09 .846 3.20 .865 
Financial oversight. 3.40 .795 3.34 .808 
Evaluating the chief executive. 2.88 1.080 3.05* .950 
Providing guidance and support to the CEO. 2.97 .979 3.18*** .792 
Understanding the board’s roles and 
responsibilities. 
2.60 .895 2.92*** .818 
Community relations and outreach. 2.11 .902 2.40*** .885 
Recruiting new board members. 2.20 .976 2.40*** .910 
Level of commitment and involvement. 2.78 .919 2.86 .858 
Increasing the diversity of the board. 1.71 .983 2.20*** 1.007 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
a In response to question “Grade your board’s performance in the following areas.”   
Scale: 0=Fail, 1=D, 2=C, 3=B, 4=A. 
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Table 2:  
Nonprofit CEO and Board Chair Perspectives on Leadership  
 
Leadership Itemsa 
CEO Rating Board Chair Rating 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
The majority of Board members are actively engaged 
in effectively overseeing and governing the 
organization. 
3.12 .692 3.23** .644 
There is effective collaboration between CEO and 
board on major decisions. 
3.63 .563 3.67 .523 
The CEO actively involves the board in leading the 
organization. 
3.52 .563 3.63** .537 
The communication between CEO and board is open 
and honest. 
3.63 .559 3.71* .504 
The CEO can share and discuss mistakes with board 
without fear. 
3.43 .678 3.64*** .518 
The Board has the right members to be effective. 2.91 .721 3.20*** .640 
An effective succession plan is in place for board 
members. 
2.62 .827 2.97*** .795 
The Board’s level of financial expertise is sufficient 
to monitor the organization’s financial health. 
3.33 .704 3.44* .643 
The orientation process is effective and enables board 
members to get up to speed quickly. 
2.81 .722 2.95** .723 
Board members coach and teach each other. 2.62 .690 2.95*** .673 
Board members help develop each other’s strengths. 2.55 .679 2.87*** .668 
Different board members take lead on different 
issues. 
3.01 .662 3.18*** .660 
Each board member contributes unique perspectives 
to issues under consideration. 
3.05 .620 3.19*** .625 
Board members listen attentively to each other, 3.33 .606 3.44** .549 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
a In response to the question “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following  
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Table 3  
Nonprofit CEO and Board Chair Perspectives on Satisfaction with Diversity 
 
Satisfaction with Board 
Diversity Itemsa 
CEO  Rating Board Chair Rating 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Age 2.65 .660 3.01*** .675 
Gender 2.78 .774 3.15*** .705 
Race/Ethnicity 2.05 .741 2.52*** .802 
Increase the Organization’s 
Ability to Achieve Missionb 
CEO  Rating Board Chair Rating 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Age 2.68 .902 2.51** .899 
Gender 2.37 .969   2.23 .914 
Race/Ethnicity 2.88 .837 2.72** .901 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
a  In response to the question “How satisfied are you with your board’s current level of  
diversity?” Scale: 1=Very Dissatisfied to 4=Very Satisfied. 
b  In response to the question “To what extent would diversity increase the organization’s 
ability to achieve its mission?” Scale 1=Not At All to 4=Great Extent. 
 
Table 4  
Nonprofit CEO and Board Chair Perspectives on Satisfaction with Board Meetings 
 
Board Meeting Itemsa 






Board members are prepared for meetings, e.g. read 
materials in advance, follow up on assignments. 
3.32 .592 3.35 .568 
Meetings are well run and use effective meeting 
practices, such as clear agendas, good facilitation, 
start/end on tine. 
3.68 .554 3.77** .454 
Board members receive information necessary to make 
informed decisions. 
3.81 .422 3.78 .447 
Board members focus on strategy and policy rather than 
on operational issues. 
3.22 .714 3.30 .639 
Meetings allow adequate time for board members to ask 
questions. 
3.50 .616 3.67*** .510 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
a In response to survey question “To what extent do the following occur.” Scale of 1=None At 









                                                          
i Additional analyses were performed to address organizational budget size when considering 
CEO and BC perspectives. Overall, these analyses did not substantially add to the results 
reported here. The additional findings are available from the first author. 
  
